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THE TRIAL OF THOMAS KWOYELO:
OPPORTUNITY OR SPECTRE? REFLECTIONS
FROM THE GROUND ON THE FIRST LRA
PROSECUTION
Anna Macdonald and Holly Porter
INTRODUCTION
The trial of Thomas Kwoyelo – the ﬁrst domestic war crimes case in Uganda –
provides a fascinating exemplar of international and domestic political machina-
tions that shape the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) accountability debate in
Uganda. Thus far, the way in which Uganda’s ﬁrst war crimes trial has been dis-
cussed and understood by those most affected by violence has been under-
explored. Analysis of Kwoyelo’s trial from the ‘bottom up’ has been limited to
journalistic and NGO accounts that tend to over-simplify the ‘victim’ perspective
as being either ‘for’ or ‘against’ the trial without exploring why this might be the
case.1 In what follows, we develop a more detailed analysis, arguing that local per-
spectives are shaped in large part by how Kwoyelo and his alleged crimes are
understood to impact upon immediate socio-economic and cosmological relation-
al dynamics in the context of a fragile peace. This, in turn, is guided by whether
Kwoyelo, as an individual, and his alleged crimes are intimately known and dir-
ectly experienced or whether both are subsumed into broader narratives about
war, peace and distrust of the government of Ugandan (GoU). Interpreting
local reactions to the trial tells us a great deal not only about the case in question,
but also about the relationship between many Acholi and those state institutions
involved in the distribution of justice. In addition, responses are indicative of the
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1For newspaper reports, see, ‘Col. Kwoyelo rearrested within minutes of his release by High
Court in Gulu’, Acholi Times, 14 November 2011 <http://justiceandreconciliation.com/media/
newsroom/in-the-news/2011/col-kwoyelo-rearrested-within-minutes-of-his-release-by-high-court-
in-gulu-acholi-times-14-nov-2011/>, accessed 10 January 2013; ‘Public divided over Kwoyelo
trial’, Daily Monitor, 10 July 2011 <http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/-/688334/
1197660/-/item/1/-/6n7y9n/-/index.html>, accessed 1 February 2012; ‘Questions raised over land-
mark Ugandan trial’, Institute of War and Peace Reporting, 11 July 2011 <https://iwpr.net/global-
voices/questions-raised-over-landmark-ugandan-trial>, accessed 12 March 2012; Matsiko (2011).
The Justice and Reconciliation Project (JRP) and the Refugee Law Project (RLP) have produced
publications that document local attitudes towards the Kwoyelo trial and the International Crimes
Division (ICD) more generally, but these tend not to provide detail on how and why particular
attitudes are constituted and their broader signiﬁcance. See, for example, the RLP’s National
Reconciliation and Transitional Justice Audit at <http://www.beyondjuba.org/NRTJA/index.
php>, accessed 5 November 2013; JRP, ‘Who forgives whom? Northern Uganda’s grassroots
views on the Amnesty Act’, policy brief, June 2012.
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complexity of Acholi attitudes towards LRA crimes and notions of appropriate
redress – whether through punishment or more compensatory measures. These,
we argue, are oriented by understandings of the wrongdoing itself and the degree
to which responses to crime are expected to have an impact on ‘social harmony’.
The article concludes with a discussion of the relevance of these ﬁndings to the
broader project of ‘transitional justice’ across the African continent.
Since the end of the Cold War, transitional justice – a set of judicial and non-
judicial measures designed to redress legacies of heinous human rights abuses –
has become a normalized and anticipated international and national response
to mass atrocity. It has become ‘institutionalised and mainstreamed, embraced
by the UN and buttressed by an emerging industry of international non-govern-
mental organisations (NGOs), expert consultants, dedicated staff at the UN
and academic journals’ (Sharp 2015: 153).2 Today, transitional justice tends to
be subsumed into broader liberal peacebuilding programmes. Africa’s ﬁrst domes-
tic war crimes court, the International Crimes Division (ICD) of the Ugandan
High Court, which is trying Kwoyelo, is indicative of this trend and comprises a
key component of Uganda’s post-LRA transitional justice strategy. As an institu-
tion, it was conceived during the Juba peace talks between the LRA and the GoU,
which took place between 2006 and 2008, and has been funded largely by
European justice sector donors, who also provide technical expertise and staff
(Nouwen 2013).
According to the UN andWorld Bank, aswell as other international aid agencies,
transitional justice in conﬂict and post-conﬂict regions delivers widespread beneﬁts,
including accountability, truth, peace, reconciliation, strengthening of the rule of
law and democratic consolidation (World Bank 2011; UNSG 2004). Critics,
however, argue that transitional justice has become part of a ‘hegemonic discourse’,
which prioritizes state-centric legal responses to mass atrocity, creating ‘empty insti-
tutions’ that fail to engage with communities that have been affected by violence
(Gready and Robins 2014: 341). Furthermore, it is argued that transitional justice
policy is ‘faith-based’ rather than ‘fact-based’: it is guided by value-driven norma-
tive assumptions about the inherent value of, say, human rights promotion, rather
than by robust evidence about occurrences on the ground (Thoms et al. 2009;
Macdonald 2015a). In response, there has been a ‘shift to the local’ in transitional
justice research in recent years (Shaw andWaldorf 2010). This has led to important,
largely ethnographic research, examining how ‘the paradigm of transitional
2The incorporation of transitional justice into the broader liberal peacebuilding agenda was
ofﬁcially realized with the launch of a UN report in 2004, The Rule of Law and Transitional
Justice in Conﬂict and Post-Conﬂict Societies, which encouraged people to think of ‘justice,
peace, and democracy’ as ‘mutually reinforcing imperatives’ that must be advanced in ‘fragile,
post-conﬂict settings’ (UNSG 2004). A 2011 follow-up report linked transitional justice to ambi-
tious institution-building and economic development objectives: it had become an ‘indispensable
element of post conﬂict strategic planning’ (UNSG 2011). The World Bank noted that same year
that transitional justice initiatives in post-conﬂict societies ‘send powerful signals about the com-
mitment of the new government to the rule of law’ (2011: 125). Since the end of the Cold War,
Sharp (2015) points to the existence of over three dozen truth commissions and ‘scores’ of
human rights prosecutions – the existence of which scholars have used as evidence of a ‘global
justice cascade’ (Sikkink 2011). For further reading on the genesis of ‘transitional justice’ as a
set of conﬂict and post-conﬂict policy objectives at the international level, see Arthur (2009)
and Sriram (2007).
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justice … is increasingly de-stabilized by its local application’ (ibid.: 6; Anders and
Zenker 2014; Hinton 2011). Despite this, the broader transitional justice ﬁeld
remains overshadowed by a set of binaries that have long dominated the debate.
These binaries tend to essentialize and objectify justice needs in post-conﬂict
places around false dichotomies of ‘local versus international’ and ‘restorative
versus retributive’ approaches, positing the notion of non-Western local order
against Western liberal order and leading to what Hinton calls ‘identity shrinkage’
(Hinton 2011: 7; Moe 2013; Macdonald forthcoming).
Uganda has been a laboratory for many of these debates, and scholarly perspec-
tives on the role of the ICD in northern Uganda’s transition from war to peace are
often framed in these terms. So, for example, criminal justice advocates argue that
Acholi people want accountability and that criminal trials will contribute to
peacebuilding and the consolidation of the rule of law across the region (Allen
2006). Critics, meanwhile, argue that a criminal justice approach is out of sync
with local practices of reconciliation and healing.3 We suggest that local perspec-
tives of the ICD and its ﬁrst trial are much more complex than either interpret-
ation allows and can tell us about how people negotiate ideas of justice and
accountability in post-conﬂict Acholiland more generally. Local perspectives are
neither homogeneous nor are they based on culturally essentialist notions or inter-
national norms; rather, they are guided by the most practical and effective means
by which to restore balance and meaning to post-conﬂict relations.
In unpacking Acholi attitudes towards Kwoyelo’s trial, this article draws upon
the two authors’ combined, long-term ﬁeldwork in the region since 2009. In re-
sponse to ﬁeldwork encounters and to events as they unfolded, we drew on ethno-
graphic and more structured data relating to the Kwoyelo case and built on this
with more targeted in-depth interviews in 2012 and 2013. The evidence we
reﬂect on here therefore includes ongoing participant observation focused on
crime, wrongdoing and its aftermath in a village where Kwoyelo is alleged to
have led and participated in violence; twenty-ﬁve focus group discussions
(FGDs) conducted across Acholiland between 2012 and 2013 on broad issues con-
cerning wrongdoing, justice, accountability and reconciliation; and over 100 semi-
structured interviews with public authority ﬁgures and other key informants
related to Kwoyelo and/or directly affected by his alleged crimes. Participant ob-
servation allowed us to set local attitudes and interactions expressed during the
FGDs and interviews in their broader historical and political context.
Additionally, relationships and trust built in our research sites fostered open com-
munication among respondents and gave us insight into the evolving narratives of
those involved. The triangulation of methods and data further allowed us to cross-
check our ideas and interpretations.
WHO IS THOMAS KWOYELO?
Thomas Kwoyelo is a former LRA member taken into custody in Uganda after
being wounded by the Ugandan People’s Defence Force (UPDF) in north-eastern
3See, for example, quotes in Lomo and Hovil (2004).
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Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in March 2009.4 His trial has been ﬁlled
with drama, intrigue and politics. Debates have centred on two interlocking
issues: the disputed seniority of Kwoyelo in the LRA; and the institutional, polit-
ical and legal conﬂict between amnesty and prosecution for war crimes in Uganda.
Kwoyelo’s own narrative, expressed through his legal team and in various court
documents, is that he was abducted by the LRA in 1987 at the age of thirteen while
on his way to Pabbo primary school. He was never afforded an opportunity to
escape and, like other abductees, he gradually rose in rank until he became a com-
mander. Following his capture he was imprisoned in Uganda.5 For Kwoyelo, the
injustice of his situation lay in the fact that other ofﬁcers, more senior to him, had
applied for and been granted amnesty under Uganda’s 2000 Amnesty Act, includ-
ing Brigadier Kenneth Banya, who was captured by the UPDF in 2004, and
former LRA spokesperson Sam Kolo, who surrendered in 2005.6 Indeed, even
sinceKwoyelo’s arrest and trial, LRA commander Caesar Acellam (often referred
to as the ‘fourth most important commander in the LRA’) has returned and been
granted amnesty.7 Kwoyelo’s submission claimed that he was a victim not only of
unequal treatment, but also of gross government negligence. ‘The same state,’
Kwoyelo’s afﬁdavit reads, ‘which should have protected me from abduction as a
child, is the same state that is prosecuting me when I have since renounced
armed rebellion.’8
The prosecution’s narrative is that Kwoyelo was, at all times relevant to the in-
dictment, a senior commander or ofﬁcer in the LRA and that he ‘occupied several
senior positions … including commander of operations, director of military intel-
ligence, and in-charge of sick bays’.9 According to Directorate of Public
Prosecution (DPP) ofﬁcials, he was not only ‘high-level’, he was also a willing
recruit who joined the LRA of his own accord in his twenties and repeatedly fru-
strated attempts by the Ugandan government to negotiate his surrender.10 In add-
ition, sources claim that the prospect of amnesty did not immediately appeal to
41st Respondent’s Afﬁdavit in reply (Lawrence Ogen Mungu, Assistant Inspector of Police,
attached to CID headquarters, Kibuli), 16 August 2011. Kwoyelo’s indictment notes that he
was arrested at Garamba National Park by the UPDF after injury in a ﬁreﬁght on 2 March
2009. According to Kwoyelo’s afﬁdavit he was captured in 2008 by the UPDF in Garamba
while assembling to await the outcome of peace talks.
5Constitutional Petition 036/2011 (Arising out of HCT-00-ICD-Case 2/2010) (on ﬁle with
author).
6Caleb Alaka’s Statement, Republic of Uganda Constitutional Appeal No. 01 of 2012, arising
from Constitutional Petition No. 36 of 2011, Arising out of HCT-00-ICD-Case 2/2010 (on ﬁle
with author).
7Field notes, 3 May 2015, recounting a public welcoming event in Gulu where ninety former
LRA members, including Caesar Acellam, received amnesty certiﬁcates and stepped on an egg,
nyono tong gweno, an Acholi homecoming and cleansing ritual after a long absence.
8Afﬁdavit in support of the Constitutional Reference No. 36 of 2011, Thomas Kwoyelo,
Respondent (on ﬁle with author).
9Amended indictment (on ﬁle with author). One of the most knowledgeable authorities on the
post-2006 LRA identiﬁes Kwoyelo as ‘a mid-level commander’ (see Cakaj 2006).
10Interview with DPP ofﬁcial, Kampala, 2 May 2012. Some sources (including Amnesty
Commission staff and lawyers in Kwoyelo’s trial) claim that Kwoyelo made a deal around the
time of the Juba peace talks to surrender in exchange for a signiﬁcant amount of money.
Reportedly, he took the money but remained active in the LRA.
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him and he applied only in early 2010 under considerable pressure from family and
his legal team.11
None of this, however, explains why, to date, Thomas Kwoyelo is the only LRA
member to have been pursued for prosecution by the ICD. When the ‘Why
Kwoyelo?’ question was put to senior DPP ofﬁcials, the answer was straight-
forward. They linked his arrest and prosecution to the political climate at the
time of his capture: peace talks between the LRA/M (Movement) and the GoU
in Juba had recently failed but an interim transitional justice agreement – the
‘Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation’ (AAR) – and an implementing
protocol (the AARaccords) had been signed by both delegations in June 2007 and
February 2008 respectively. The accords laid out national procedures for dealing
with LRA andUPDF crimes committed during the conﬂict, including setting up a
special division of the High Court of Uganda to hear domestic war crimes trials.12
Despite the lack of signatures on the ﬁnal peace agreement, the GoU remained
ostensibly committed to implementing the AAR accords. As a DPP ofﬁcial
explained: ‘At that time … peace talks had just collapsed but the AARwas in ex-
istence; his arrest was timely and that is why we picked on him.’13 Furthermore,
international donors were greatly enthused by the idea of a Ugandan war
crimes court and Kwoyelo’s fate therefore became tied up with broader concerns
relating to donor ﬁnancing of this new legal ediﬁce (Nouwen 2013: 182). A lawyer
close to the process explained that ‘so much has been sunk into the court. They
had to have that ﬁrst trial.’14 Nevertheless, the prosecution’s decision to bring a
case against a former LRA member who had evidently applied for amnesty
while the Amnesty Act was still in operation remained surprising, raising
serious questions about prosecutorial strategy and expected outcomes.
THE PATH TO PROSECUTION
The trial was preceded by two decades of armed conﬂict, and heated domestic and
international debate about how crimes committed during this time should be
addressed. In 1986, President Museveni and the National Resistance Army/
Movement (NRA/M) came to power in Uganda after a ﬁve-year guerrilla war.
Almost immediately, the new NRM government, made up primarily of Bantu-
speaking southerners, launched a military campaign to stamp out opposition in
the north, the home region of previous rulers in postcolonial Uganda. This had
the opposite effect, sparking a number of armed rebellions. The most enduring
and devastating of these was led by the LRA. The GoU’s counter-insurgency
policy, from the mid-1990s onwards, was to create free ﬁring zones by moving
11Interview with DPP ofﬁcial, Kampala, 2 May 2012; ﬁeld notes, Kampala, April–June 2012.
12These included ‘traditional’ justice processes, a ‘body’ to ‘inquire into the past’, and repara-
tions for victims. With respect to amnesty, in place since 2000 and covering Ugandans ‘formerly or
currently’ engaged in rebellion against the NRM government, the AAR recommended that gov-
ernment ‘introduce any amendments to the Amnesty Act … to bring it into conformity with the
principles of this agreement’. Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation between the
Government of Uganda and the LRA, 20 June 2007, paragraph 14, clause 4.
13Interview with DPP ofﬁcial, Kampala, 2 May 2012.
14Interview with Ugandan lawyer, Kampala, 22 May 2012.
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civilians into squalid internally displaced persons’ (IDP) camps where the UPDF
could ‘protect’ them (WHO 2005). At the peakof this displacement, it was estimated
that some 90 per cent of the Acholi population in the sub-region were being kept in
wretched conditions in ‘rural prisons’, subject to both UPDF and LRA violence.15
In December 2003, President Museveni referred the ‘situation concerning the LRA’
to the newly established International Criminal Court (ICC) (Nouwen 2013: 390).
The ICC issued its ﬁrst arrest warrants in July 2005, targeting ﬁve LRA com-
manders and placing northern Uganda at the heart of transitional justice
debates. One year later, in July 2006, peace talks began in Juba and relative
calm came to northern Uganda. In December 2008, talks collapsed when LRA
leader Joseph Kony failed to sign the ﬁnal peace agreement and a joint military
operation commenced (mostly in DRC) against the LRA: Operation Lightning
Thunder.16 By then, the LRA had moved outside Uganda and borders were effect-
ively sealed to prevent their return. Since then, ‘guns have fallen silent’ in northern
Uganda and by 2010 the vast majority of Acholi who had lived in IDP camps had
returned to their areas of origin or had resettled elsewhere (UNHCR 2015).
The ICD of the Ugandan High Court ofﬁcially came into being in May 2011.17
Thus far, two major obstacles have impeded its progress. The ﬁrst is that Uganda’s
2000 Amnesty Act, coveringUgandans ‘formerly or currently engaged in rebellion
against the NRM government’, remains in effect, after a brief lapse between
May 2012 and May 2013.18 An amendment to the Act in 2006 allowed the
Minister of Internal Affairs to bar individuals from receiving amnesty with
parliamentary approval, but no such steps have been taken.19 The second obstacle
is that any prosecution of government-linked war crimes under the current
government is highly unlikely. The ofﬁcial reason is that an accountability
system – the court martial system – is already in place for UPDF crimes. The
unofﬁcial explanation, given by senior staff in the Justice Law and Order Sector
(JLOS), is that ‘the DPP would never investigate [UPDF crimes] because the
ICD is a victor’s court … keeping the UPDF out protects the NRM’
(Macdonald 2015b: 183).
After Kwoyelo’s capture in 2009, he was placed in the custody of military intel-
ligence for approximately three months before being handed over for prosecution.
On 4 June 2009, he was charged before Gulu Chief Magistrates’ Court with
offences under the Penal Code Act, including kidnapping with intent to
murder.20 The case was adjourned for further investigation and Kwoyelo was
15For overviews of the war, see Allen and Vlassenroot (2010) and Dolan (2011).
16For a thorough examination of the dynamics of the Juba peace talks, see Schomerus (2012).
17Republic of Uganda, The High Court (International Crimes Division), Practice Directions,
Legal Notice no. 10 of 2011, Legal Notices Supplement, Uganda Gazette, no. 38, vol. CIV (31
May 2011).
18GoU, Amnesty Act 2012 (Declaration of Lapse of the Operation of Part II), Instrument s.2,
May 2012.
19GoU, The Ugandan Amnesty (Amendment) Act, 2006; An Act to amend the Amnesty Act,
Cap. 294. According to a senior ICD ofﬁcial, a request to exclude someone from amnesty
would be ‘too difﬁcult to uphold against criticism in Parliament … because, on what basis can
you say “this one in, this one out”’. Interview with ICD ofﬁcial, Kampala, 25 April 2012. See
also Nouwen (2013: 215).
20Afﬁdavit in support of the Constitutional Reference No. 36 of 2011, Thomas Kwoyelo,
Respondent (on ﬁle with author); ‘LRA’s Kwoyelo charged with kidnap’, New Vision, 4 June
703KWOYELO’S TRIAL AND THE LRA
of use, available at http:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S000197201600053X
Downloaded from http:/www.cambridge.org/core. London School of Economics Lib, on 18 Nov 2016 at 15:07:07, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
remanded to prison in Gulu, and later transferred to Luzira maximum security
prison near Kampala.21
Kwoyelo applied for amnesty in January 2010 while in custody at Luzira.22 On
19 March 2010, the Amnesty Commission wrote to the DPP that ‘the Amnesty
Commission considers him as one who is qualiﬁed to beneﬁt from the Amnesty
process’.23 It requested the DPP’s certiﬁcation, under sections 3 and 4 of the
Act, that Kwoyelo was not being detained for any crimes unrelated to rebellion.24
The DPP never responded, so amnesty was not granted. Instead, in August 2010,
two months after the ICC Review Conference had taken place in Kampala,
Kwoyelo was charged with twelve counts of violating Uganda’s 1964 Geneva
Conventions Act, including wilful killing, taking hostages, and extensive destruc-
tion of property. When Kwoyelo’s trial eventually opened on 11 July 2011 at Gulu
High Court (the ICD used these premises for the trial), the prosecution submitted
an amended indictment, adding ﬁfty-three ‘alternative’ charges under Uganda’s
penal code, including murder, kidnapping and robbery.25
Kwoyelo pleaded not guilty to all charges, and his defence team raised objec-
tions to the constitutionality of the case. On 16 August, the Constitutional
Court heard submissions regarding the objections, which were twofold. The ﬁrst
was that, in being refused amnesty, Kwoyelo was being denied equal treatment
under Uganda’s Amnesty Act.26 The second was that Kwoyelo’s initial detention
period under the UPDF was unconstitutional. In a surprise move, the Attorney
General’s representative argued that the Amnesty Act itself was unconstitutional,
and should not therefore prevent Kwoyelo’s case from proceeding. On 22
September, the Constitutional Court delivered its ruling: it found that the Act
was constitutional, and that this should bar Kwoyelo’s case from proceeding
because he was being treated unequally under it.27
Following this ruling, Kwoyelo’s lawyers presented a petition to the High Court
requesting his release from prison. In January 2012, the High Court ruled in
Kwoyelo’s favour, but he has remained in Luzira ever since.28 Meanwhile, the
DPP immediately appealed to the Supreme Court against the Constitutional
Court decision. Over three and a half years later, in April 2015, the Supreme
Court judges ruled that there is nothing unconstitutional about the Amnesty
Act but that it does not grant blanket amnesty in all criminal cases, and thus
2009 <http://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1242836/lra-eur-kwoyelo-charged-kidnap>,
accessed 7 August 2012.
21‘LRA’s Kwoyelo charged with kidnap’, New Vision, 4 June 2009 <http://www.newvision.co.
ug/new_vision/news/1242836/lra-eur-kwoyelo-charged-kidnap>, accessed 7 December 2012.
22According to the Respondent’s Afﬁdavit, Kwoyelo applied for amnesty on 4 January 2010 and
‘the matter was forwarded to the DPP for certiﬁcation’. According to Kwoyelo’s afﬁdavit, the ap-
plication was made on 10 January 2010.
23Letter from Amnesty Commission to DPP, 19 March 2010 (on ﬁle with author).
24Afﬁdavit in support of the Constitutional Reference No. 36 of 2011, Thomas Kwoyelo,
Respondent (on ﬁle with author). See also Nouwen (2013: 215).
25Uganda’s ICC Act came into force in March of that year, and restrictions in Uganda’s consti-
tution against retroactive application of laws resulted in a decision not to charge Kwoyelo under it.
26Constitutional Petition 036/2011 (Arising out of HCT-00-ICD-Case 2/2010).
27For a summary of arguments deployed to uphold the Act, see Nouwen (2013: 220).
28Kwoyelo’s lawyers lodged a petition to the African Commission on Human and People’s
Rights to challenge his continued pre-trial detention, but the ACHPR has not yet made a ruling.
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the decision not to grant Kwoyelo amnesty was not proof that he has been treated
unequally and the trial could proceed. It is currently planned to recommence in
October 2016 but may well be postponed.29
INTERPRETING LOCAL REACTIONS TO THE KWOYELO TRIAL
The Kwoyelo trial has been a topic of intense media and public interest.
Journalists record ‘divided’ views among generic ‘LRAvictims’, who are reported
as seeing Kwoyelo either as a violent perpetrator who must face justice in a court
of law, or as a victim himself who should be forgiven and reintegrated into his
community through ‘traditional’ methods.30 Members of NGO staff working in
northern Uganda, meanwhile, are quoted as criticizing the trial because of its se-
lective nature.31 Some go further, arguing that legal prosecutions are culturally
and politically inappropriate in this context.32 In each of our research sites these
views came up. But there were also observable patterns in the way people talked
about the trial that are not captured in these accounts.
Below, we explore reactions of different people who might ordinarily be lumped
into the category of ‘victim’. These include local politicians, Kwoyelo’s relatives,
childhood acquaintances, and forced wives within the LRA, as well as those who
were directly impacted by the violence he is alleged to have committed and those
who were not. Interpreting these reactions tells us a great deal not only about the
case in question, but also about: (1) something central to Acholi perceptions and
practices concerning wrongdoing and justice in general; (2) the complexity of
people’s attitudes towards LRA crimes; and (3) the relationship between many
Acholi people and the various state, non-state and hybrid institutions involved
in justice endeavours. Across research sites, attitudes towards the trial shifted
29‘Rebel chief Kwoyelo yet to know amnesty fate’, New Vision, 19 March 2014 <http://www.
newvision.co.ug/news/653701-rebel-chief-kwoyelo-yet-to-know-amnesty-fate.html>, accessed 19
March 2014; ‘Kwoyelo amnesty plea ﬂops’, New Vision, 8 April 2015 <http://www.newvision.
co.ug/news/666800-kwoyelo-amnesty-plea-ﬂops.html>, accessed 10 April 2015.
30See sources in note 1.
31See the quote by Stephen Oola, Head of Research and Advocacy, RLP, arguing that the se-
lective nature of the Kwoyelo case ‘may have a negative impact on abductees who are still held by
the LRA… some may not attempt a risky escape from the bush out of fear that they will be pro-
secuted’ (Schenkel 2015). See also the quote from Lino Owor Ogora, then Head of Research and
Advocacy at JRP: ‘I think the war crime division really wanted to have a case on the ground
because we are failing to understand why and how they arrived at Kwoyelo’, in ‘Public divided
over Kwoyelo trial’, Daily Monitor, 10 July 2011 <http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/-/
688334/1197660/-/item/1/-/6n7y9n/-/index.html>, accessed 1 February 2012.
32See, for example, the quote by Lino Owor Ogora, then Head of Research and Advocacy at
JRP, reiterating a call for the promotion of traditional justice and arguing that ‘the way
forward is to reconcile Kwoyelo with the victims in Pabbo’; the quote by Bishop Ochola,
Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative, arguing that ‘northern Ugandan leaders want … rec-
onciliation in the communities through community-based collective responsibility, not western-
style prosecutions’ (Newman 2013); and the quote by Stephen Oola, Head of Research and
Advocacy, RLP, referring to the related issue of the restoration of the 2000 Amnesty Act in
2013 as ‘a big opportunity for the country to answer prayers for people, particularly in northern
Uganda, crying for their persons still held in captivity by the Lord’s Resistance Army’, in ‘Rebel
amnesty reinstated in Uganda’, IRIN News, 30 May 2013 <http://www.irinnews.org/report/98133/
rebel-amnesty-reinstated-uganda>, accessed 7 September 2013.
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depending on whether respondents ‘individuated’ or ‘de-individuated’Kwoyelo.33
By ‘individuate’, we mean that people single out Kwoyelo and give an individual
or distinctive character to him as somebody they knew and/or to his particular
crimes as memorable acts that they or somebody within their immediate commu-
nity had suffered. The LRA’s military strategy relied on a system of sector com-
manders; this means that often a particular commander, such as Kwoyelo, is
closely associated with crimes carried out in a speciﬁc location. By ‘de-individu-
ate’, we refer to the responses of people who did not know Kwoyelo personally
and did not suffer from his crimes directly. Those who ‘de-individuated’ him
and his crimes subsumed him and his trial into broader narratives about
amnesty, forgiveness and NRM political manipulation that have shaped the tran-
sitional justice debate in Acholiland. Avery powerful narrative, espoused by local
political, religious and cultural leaders, as well as by supportive NGOs, empha-
sizes that the vast majority of LRA ﬁghters, even those in senior ranks, were
abducted against their will, and so, for the duration of their time in the LRA,
their personal autonomy was entirely suspended. They therefore cannot be held
culpable for their actions. In this historically contingent narrative, victims could
easily have been perpetrators and the perpetrators themselves were victims.34
Thus characters such as Kwoyelo no longer have an individual identity; rather,
they take on a broader social and collective identity – that of the innocent
child, abducted against his or her will, deprived of personal agency, forced to
commit terrible crimes, and whose fate is now subject to the vicissitudes of a
hostile central state.
It is worth elaborating here on concepts ‘self’ and ‘identity’ in African studies.
Piot’s concept of the ‘relational self’ (1999) and Shaw’s concept of ‘relational
individualism’ (2000) are pertinent to our ﬁndings. Both locate identity in pre-
existing relational ﬁelds, where the construction of the self is ‘fundamentally
connected – not only to other people (both living relatives and dead ancestors),
but also to place, spiritual forces and a sense of built in order’ (Adams and
Dzokoto 2010: 346). These relational ﬁelds tend to comprise relatively ‘close per-
sonal spaces’ (ibid.; Jackson 1989; Piot 1999; Shaw 2000). Research on ‘enemy dis-
course’ in African settings, for example, ﬁnds that ‘almost all misfortune is caused
by people with whom you have some relation’: friends, neighbours, relatives and
other people within the community (Adams and Dzokoto 2010: 348; Assimeng
1989; Fisiy and Geschiere 1996). Kwoyelo is directly connected to relational
orders in villages where people knew him and/or directly experienced his alleged
crimes. In those places, the material and social interdependence of everyday
lives provides common ground within which he is ‘individuated’, and
33We employ these terms as descriptors and not with any reference to similarly named theories
of individuation and deindividuation in the analytical and social psychology literature, or those
found in philosophy and in the media industry.
34The debate surrounding the ‘victim-perpetrator’ in international law and ethics is under the
spotlight at the moment as ICC-accused LRA commander Dominic Ongwen is due to stand trial
in The Hague. For interesting insights on his status as a victim-perpetrator, see contributions by
Adam Branch and Alex Whiting on the online symposium ‘The Dominic Ongwen trial and the
prosecution of child soldiers’, hosted by Justice in Conﬂict: <https://justiceinconﬂict.org/2016/
04/11/the-dominic-ongwen-trial-and-the-prosecution-of-child-soldiers-a-jic-symposium/>, accessed
19 April 2016.
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interpretations of him as a person and the risks and dangers he poses make sense.
Further away from ‘close personal spaces’ where he was known and militarily
active, constructions of his identity tend to be different. Because he was not con-
nected to others in a network of personal relationships, he is more likely to be ‘de-
individuated’. Interpretations of his situation as the ﬁrst LRA ﬁghter to face state
justice are understood through a collective identity that people ascribe to him,
based on broader shared narratives about victimhood and the LRA conﬂict,
and immanent concerns about NRM victor’s justice and its potentially dangerous
material and social implications for peacebuilding in Acholiland.
While we do not claim that attitudes were entirely consistent across research
sites, we noticed discernible trends in the ways in which people talked about
Kwoyelo and his trial. Which of the above approaches people adopted was
usually shaped by their own wartime experiences and if or howKwoyelo’s prosecu-
tion related to their current circumstances. This in turn, as will be elaborated
below, was linked to the centrality of two integral aspects of lived Acholi realities:
the profound value of social harmony, and distrust of higher authorities to dis-
pense justice – whether through punishment or compensation. The following ana-
lysis allows for fuller understanding of the ICD and its ﬁrst case as more than just
a court and a legal process but rather as an arena in which ‘subjectivities are
shaped’ (Wilke 2010: 120). The Kwoyelo trial re-enacted ‘periods of violence
and state repression’, while respondents’ different experiences of that recent
history produced varying interpretations of the ‘justness’ of the process (ibid.).
KWOYELO’S TRIAL: OPPORTUNITY OR SPECTRE?
People who suffered directly at Kwoyelo’s hands, or knew others who had done so,
described a profoundly dangerous man who willingly joined the LRA in his adult
life and went on to perpetrate heinous crimes. Kwoyelo’s trial thus connoted an
opportunity, albeit vague, to achieve some form of redress for wrongdoing that
was experienced. The attack on Pagak camp in Amuru in May 2005 was a particu-
larly distressing example of his alleged crimes. Former camp leaders said that he
personally ordered the slaughter of more than twenty women, many with babies
on their backs. His victims were taken outside the camp and beaten with logs.
Most died. Camp leaders later found one woman who had survived:
She had been terribly beaten. She was making these signs, directing us to the place where
the women had been slaughtered. At that time, she did not even know that the child she
was carrying on her back had been beaten to death.35
Kwoyelo allegedly commanded the massacre in order to punish female camp resi-
dents who had recently greeted defected LRA ﬁghters with ululations (a common
Acholi celebratory exclamation).
During his trial, the media noted the presence of Kwoyelo’s elderly, barefoot
mother in the courtroom, and that Kwoyelo himself is a diminutive ﬁgure, short
and slight. This lent credence to the notion of Kwoyelo as a child-like victim,
35Interview, Amuru District, Uganda, 27 August 2013.
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and sympathetic quotes from his relatives were reported in the newspapers and on
national television.36 On one day in court, attended by one of the authors, a young
man wore a black T-shirt with the words ‘right beside you brother’ inscribed
across his chest.
In the area where Kwoyelo grew up, however, roughly 40 kilometres north of
Gulu town, men and women frowned deeply when his name was mentioned.
One community leader explained that:
even if he is set free, his relatives might accept him but his neighbours who suffered? No,
he will not be OK. In Acholi when you kill my relative, then I really think you should be
killed.37
Many women in particular wanted people to know what Kwoyelo had done to
them and their families. ‘He was a prominent commander,’ said one. ‘He abducted
our children; killed our children… we have fears that if he returns he will continue
to wreak havoc and commit crimes.’38 A group of men agreed:
Thomas Kwoyelo makes us really unhappy. We feel so aggrieved by what he did… he is
our son but he committed a lot of atrocities here in this place… You have come here and
one of the things you notice is that the place is quiet. It is quiet because Kwoyelo wiped
away the boys of this area, the able-bodied youth, who could be doing a lot of activities
now.39
In the words of one woman: ‘What Kwoyelo did to me and my family was really
unspeakable.’40
Those respondents who particularized Kwoyelo’s crimes generally welcomed
his trial and the prospect of his eventual punishment. The legal intricacies of
the case and objections on the basis of unfair treatment under the Amnesty Act
cut little ice. Most who claimed to be his victims wanted him excommunicated
from their social and moral communities by whatever means possible. In
Pabbo, Amuru District, a local politician spoke of three categories of people
who are ‘beyond reconciliation’: those who suffered direct violence; those
whose children were abducted by him; and those with personal knowledge of
his atrocities. As one man said: ‘If it were the people who were to have arrested
him then I think they would have killed him, but good enough it is the government
who did so.’41
In Kwoyelo’s home area, elders appeared willing to transfer their disciplinary
roles to the GoU, allowing the government to act as Kwoyelo’s overseer. They per-
ceived him as a deeply destabilizing force, perpetrating crimes too numerous and
profound for the local community alone to deal with. Some hoped that he would
face life in prison after trial; some called for the death penalty. Others expressed a
hope that a period of incarceration would allow him to see the error of his ways
36See sources in note 1.
37FGD, Amuru District, Uganda, 9 August 2012.
38Ibid.
39Ibid.
40Interview, Amuru District, Uganda, 27 September 2013.
41FGD, Pabbo, Amuru District, Uganda, 9 August 2012.
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and ‘learn his lesson’.42 Some argued that his prosecution ‘sets a very good
example to those who have been given amnesty and later went back to [LRA] cap-
tivity to commit more atrocities’.43
The relationship between trials, incarceration, punishment, compensation and
reconciliation is unsettled. When people talked about the Kwoyelo trial they dis-
played a frustrated sense of turmoil about how each of these can and should ﬁt
together. This was indicative of the range of options and constraints people
faced in their search for redress. As this elder’s comment illustrates:
In Acholi, there is a law that says if you kill someone, you should be killed. Then I could
forget. Because I would not want to see him walking and my relatives are nowhere to be
seen. So, he should be put in life prison. Yeah, maybe that would sound better. And gov-
ernment should also ﬁnd away of compensating for all the things people lost. In that way
a person like Kwoyelo could be forgiven. And then he could come forward for Mato
Oput.44 But it is very impossible for him to do that with each victim. That is why I say
that the government must provide. If they did, it would then be unfair to put him in
prison according to tradition.45
‘Compensation,’ as one NGOworker familiar with the Kwoyelo case put it, ‘is the
common language that victims speak’; it is often described as something tangible
that the government could do to help them ‘forget’ the dreadful experiences they
suffered. Yet communities affected by violence understandably qualify their desire
for compensation with an acknowledgement of the deeply unequal political
system they inhabit. There are numerous examples of failed expectations,
broken promises and divisive politicization arising from ad hoc reparation
schemes proposed and implemented in the Acholi region.46 In discussions about
the role reparations might play in delivering some degree of justice, people’s
spoken and physical reactions revealed the tensions such questions pose. Their
reactions expressed a sense of what Campbell (2004: 335) calls the ‘trauma of
justice’: ‘the trauma of justice is that it is a juridical impossibility … justice
requires a fundamental change to the social order which made possible the origin-
ary trauma of crimes against humanity. In this sense, justice remains an event to
come.’ While reparations are an absolute priority for most war-affected Acholi,
they are regarded as ‘an event to come’, something that is probably not possible
under current political circumstances. Their absence, however, represents a
42FGD, Amuru District, Uganda, 10 August 2012.
43Ibid. Although not in court afﬁdavits, stories were recounted in interviews of Kwoyelo being
involved with an earlier rebel group prior to joining the LRA and having spent time in prison.
While in the LRA, Kwoyelo is also widely believed to have gone back and forth between camp/
home and the bush a number of times.
44Mato Oput literally means drinking of bitter root andwas customarily used in cases of murder
or accidental death. It is performed at the culmination of negotiations to reconcile clans of the
wrongdoer and the wronged and to compensate for loss of life.
45Interview, Amuru District, Uganda, 27 August 2013.
46In Atiak sub-county, a politicized reparation scheme linked to land disputes in the area has
caused a lot of inter-communal tension (see Macdonald 2015b: 165–7); compensation payments
to the Acholi War Claimants’ Debt Association have also been riven with controversy (ibid.). In
April 2014, the Ugandan parliament passed a resolution calling for the establishment of a gender-
sensitive reparations fund for men and women affected by the LRA war, but, to date, that reso-
lution has not been put into action.
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severe and paralyzing obstacle to the reconstruction of meaningful and productive
social and economic relationships.
Thus, there was the idea that some people were ‘beyond reconciliation’, as
stated by the local politician in Pabbo, and that traditional and informal processes
did not have the capacity to deal with a case such as Kwoyelo’s. A prominent re-
ligious leader explained that certain crimes are so far beyond the normal realm
that they are not in Acholi tradition, and therefore traditional methods of com-
pensation and reconciliation cannot be used to address them. Crimes such as
those of which Kwoyelo is accused are ‘in the realm of demons’, and are so
dark and so counter to ideal Acholi social values that their existence is attributed
to para-human causes. As such, social reintegration of the perpetrator would be
perilous.47 For many Acholi, particularly those who knew his alleged crimes in
detail, Kwoyelo had placed himself outside the moral jurisdiction of Acholi
responses to wrongdoing and hence of local ways of handling him, particularly
without any serious prospect of equitable government ﬁnancial intervention to
cover compensation payments for his victims (Porter 2013: 132–4). But was the
ICD and its ﬁrst war crimes trial a legitimate alternative?
The evidence suggests something more complicated. Despite a generally sup-
portive attitude towards the trial and towards punishing Kwoyelo, people –
even alleged victims, including a former forced wife who recounted tales of dread-
ful abuse at Kwoyelo’s hands and who therefore might be expected to have a stake
in the outcome – rarely expressed knowledge of, or engagement with, actual court
proceedings. Logistical issues played a role: the expense involved in travelling to
the High Court in Gulu and the lack of court outreach meant that people generally
knew little about the progress of the trial. A more pained response related to the
prospective trauma of failed expectations. One man explained how seeing
Kwoyelo released would make him ‘feel too bad’.48 Another knew that, even
though he felt Kwoyelo should ‘go through a court of law’, he was not under
any illusion that the trial itself could help him come to terms with what he had
experienced.49 A sub-county chief from the area where Kwoyelo was operational
explained:
in general terms, we support that trial but the community has developed a resilience and
the court issue is a technical issue which the layman may not comprehend so people get
on with their business.50
Outside the place ‘from where he grew’, and away from areas in Acholiland dir-
ectly affected by operations he allegedly commanded, Kwoyelo was more likely
to be painted as a victim of government manipulation and victor’s justice. His
plight and trial tended to be abstracted and slotted into broader narratives of
structural violence and inequality between the GoU and Acholi. As legal proceed-
ings played out over mid- to late 2011, conspiracy theories, rumours and
47See retired Anglican Bishop Ochola’s 2009 lecture ‘Spirituality of reconciliation’ at <http://
www.usask.ca/stu/emmanuel/docs/spirituality-of-reconciliation.doc>, accessed 3 June 2013.
48Interview, Amuru District, Uganda, 20 August 2013.
49Interview, Amuru District, Uganda, 27 August 2013.
50Interview, Amuru District, Uganda, 20 August 2013.
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misinformation were rife as people speculated and repeated as fact their under-
standing of why events were unfolding as they were. Here, the trial did not re-
present an opportunity for deserved punishment; instead it came to symbolize
people’s anxieties about the refractory nature of ‘distanced’ justice. Gready uses
the terms ‘embedded’ and ‘distanced’ to discuss divergent approaches to justice
(Gready 2005). The distinction is both spatial and moral – it applies not only to
the physical proximity of the justice mechanism to the location of the victim,
but also to the extent to which the justice process carries a degree of legitimacy
and credibility among affected individuals and communities. The inference is
that even a physically ‘distanced’ institution can become ‘embedded’ if those
closest to injustice see it as legitimate (Porter 2012). However, for many Acholi,
continued distrust of central government meant that the ICD remained a
‘distant’ institution. The focus of many people’s concerns with Kwoyelo’s trial
was the seemingly arbitrary decision not to grant him amnesty. A lack of familiar-
ity with Kwoyelo’s exact crimes led to cost–beneﬁt calculations about the trial that
were very different from those of people who could link their suffering directly to
his alleged orders or actions. On the one hand, it was feared that the trial would
deter those who remain in the bush from returning; on the other, there was concern
that senior commanders who had already been granted amnesty would become
nervous and even belligerent. Either way, the trial appeared to disturb the
ground upon which peace was believed to rest. As one man said: ‘If we don’t
handle this sensitively, we might blow up another rebellion.’ According to him,
and many others, badly implemented ‘justice’ risked adding to grievances rather
than addressing them.51
Interestingly, opposition to the trial was often expressed with reference to the
ICC. Despite not having formal institutional links, the ICD resulted from negotia-
tions at the Juba peace talks, as away of addressing the ICC impasse. The key criti-
cism of both courts was that they were a political tool of the GoU, and would not
apply the law equally to both sides of the conﬂict. In a public meeting in Gulu to
mark the ten-year anniversary of the ICC, one young man stood up and said:
We are victims of a war. Museveni triggered this and we are still watching the games that
are being played. So how far is the ICC and its arm in Uganda for us?52
His solution, greeted with cheers from the crowd, was that the ICD should be
closed until Museveni is placed in the dock, ‘and then the court can start its
work!’53 According to a local politician, unresolved political tensions between
the NRM and ‘the Acholi’ made widespread support for the ICD impossible.
He explained that ‘there are those here who hate this government and they
oppose the court because it is under Museveni’.54 This challenges the often
asserted trope that Acholi people are opposed to ‘formal’ or ‘retributive’ justice
for cultural reasons55 and highlights the key role political and economic realities
51Discussion with village leaders and ﬁeld notes, Amuru District, Uganda, 11 February 2011.
52Participant observation, ‘The ICC ten years on’, Uganda International Criminal Court
Coalition Dialogue, Bomah Hotel, Gulu, Uganda, 5 July 2012.
53Ibid.
54Interview, Amuru District, Uganda, 28 August 2013.
55For a summary of these arguments, see Baines (2005). For a critique, see Branch (2014).
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play in people’s calculations about post-war accountability. State-led transitional
justice processes, as promoted by donors and JLOS, are often regarded as a red
herring because people have a clear, lived understanding of NRM hegemony
and its narrative about the war, and because there is virtually no current prospect
of the government delivering a fair and comprehensive policy offering ﬁnancial
compensation for people’s wartime losses.
Most of the time, perspectives on Kwoyelo’s trial were based on people’s
wartime experiences, but local politicians and leaders often made more calculated
decisions about how to present Kwoyelo and his trial. Norbert Mao, former op-
position MP, Gulu District Chairman and presidential candidate, was one of
Kwoyelo’s greatest champions and promoter of the narrative that painted him
as an innocent man, abducted and forced into terrible crimes against his will.
‘Above all,’ Mao told a journalist in July 2011, ‘Kwoyelo was a child that
should have been protected by the government.’56 Many religious and cultural
leaders also vocally opposed the trial and referred to him as a ‘child’ who
should be reintegrated back into his community through Christian forgiveness
and cultural processes under their auspices (Macdonald 2015b: 238).
Conversely, a local politician from Kwoyelo’s area, also a member of the NRM,
supported the trial, arguing that both Mao and religious leaders ‘misﬁre’. ‘Mao
should have come and crosschecked with the people here,’ he said, adding that re-
ligious leaders promote ‘only one verse of the Acholi reconciliatory set-up because
traditionally we have very severe punishments in Acholi’.57
Such politicians and government ofﬁcials who support the trial typically ‘indi-
viduate’ Kwoyelo, recounting his crimes and going into detail about his character
and refusal to surrender. His wrongs are deﬁned by the belief that they emanate
from his true and immutable essence of character rather than by ‘law’.
Common sympathetic statements about ICC-accused Dominic Ongwen following
his surrender and eventual transfer to The Hague in early 2015 illustrate the other
side of the coin. Despite the gravity of crimes listed on his arrest warrant, includ-
ing crimes against humanity and war crimes, as a person he is thought to be rela-
tively decent, and the fact that he was abducted by the LRA as a young child is not
disputed. For many, Ongwen’s alleged actions are perceived as distinct from his
moral core and believed to be the result of terrible circumstances.58 In contrast,
Kwoyelo was often characterized as a ‘wrong’ person. Those who knew him
when he was young recounted rough and bullish behaviour in his pre-LRA
youth. In this understanding, his actions were not due to the ‘bad surroundings’
of war (Finnström 2008) but because essentially at his core he is rotten. The
same NRM politician quoted above extended this logic to the attitude of the GoU:
The government also takes into consideration that person in the bush. You see, if someone
is active, government decides that person can still be dangerous when at large. These are
state things. That is how you can weigh how likely they are to reform. Like Banya was
just an Mzee, moving around the bush, he was never implicated in orders. But the
56Quoted in Matsiko (2011).
57Interview, Amuru District, 27 August 2013.
58Interview with former forced ‘wife’ of Ongwen, Gulu, February 2015; participant observation
of public discussion regarding Ongwen, Gulu, 16 January 2015.
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Kwoyelos, with the community here, it is all muddy. His footmarks are tainted, it is bloody.
That is what government does, to ﬁnd out these things. I don’t think if you were sitting in
state house you would say, oh, let’s set that one [Kwoyelo] free.59
Dismissing the idea of the DPP as a nominally autonomous institution,60 he
argued that ‘the government’ had to make decisions about who to prosecute on
the basis of prospective deterrence and expected recidivism. An Amnesty
Commission ofﬁcial agreed, comparing Kwoyelo to a child who plays too
roughly and government to a parent who witnesses the child regularly beating
up his peers, undeterred despite multiple warnings. Knowing he is a bully, when
another child cries, the parents require no speciﬁc evidence of guilt. They know
which child to ‘grab, beat and lock in their room’.61
Kwoyelo himself seemed aware of such opinions when, in late December 2013,
after over four years in pre-trial detention, he gave his ﬁrst public interview to a
journalist from the government-sponsored New Vision newspaper. He said that
he had beneﬁted from a ‘peace making and reconciliation programme’ in
prison and now ‘realised my past mistakes’, committing to ‘work with the
Government at all cost’ and pledging that ‘once considered for clemency, I
swear I will never go back to rebel activities’.62 Whether Kwoyelo’s lawyers
advised him to make this statement or he simply ‘gave a passing journalist
some good copy’ (Bradﬁeld 2014), he was probably aware that senior LRA com-
mander Caesar Acellam, reportedly captured on 12 May 2012, was not handed
over to the police, but instead has undergone what the UPDF 4th Division
Intelligence Ofﬁcer Major Patrick Bugiriwa described as ‘rehabilitation’:
if the higher command feel that he has been rehabilitated enough to join the UPDF ranks
then why not? We believe people can change as we have a process of continuous sensitiza-
tion and brainwashing so as he becomes a better person … the UPDF system that we
have been using of brainwashing rebels will never lead to any betrayal.63
Thus, at the political level, the alternative fate of senior LRA commanders who
were captured or surrendered after Kwoyelo is not just a legal anomaly, it is indi-
cative of a political and military approach that eschews deﬁned rules of engage-
ment when it comes to conﬂict-related crimes, and evades formulation of policy
that encourages such rules. The government uses legislative processes and legal
institutions strategically in order to control political, social and military threats.64
59Interview, Amuru District, Uganda, 27 August 2013.
60The DPP is appointed by the President with the approval of parliament. According to the
Ugandan constitution, it is an ‘autonomous institution not subject to the direction or control
of any person or authority’: see <http://www.dpp.go.ug/index.php/about-dpp>.
61Personal communication with Amnesty Commission ofﬁcial, Gulu, Uganda, 16 April 2015.
62‘Kwoyelo pleads for clemency’,New Vision, 30 December 2013 <http://www.newvision.co.ug/
news/650959-kwoyelo-pleads-for-clemency.html>, accessed 30 December 2013.
63‘If rehabilitated enough, LRA’s Acellam is welcome to join UPDF – 4th Division Intelligence
Ofﬁcer’, Acholi Times, 8 July 2013 <http://www.acholitimes.com/index.php?option=com_content&
view=article&id=1538:if-rehabilitated-enough-lra-s-acellam-is-welcome-to-join-updf-4th-division-
intelligence-ofﬁcer&catid=8:acholi-news&Itemid=101>, accessed 10 July 2013.
64In the context of Ugandan politics, a pattern of ‘strategic ambiguity’ in the regulation of law
and order has been noted by other scholars. Tapscott (2015: 23), for example, in her study of the
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SOCIAL HARMONY
The varied local responses to Kwoyelo’s trial are further explained by the highly
valued ideal of ‘social harmony’ in Acholi society. Research indicates that
notions of appropriate punishment are guided by understandings of the act of
wrongdoing itself and by the degree to which the perpetrator is considered to be
important to future social harmony (Porter 2013: 39). Social harmony refers to
a state of normal relations among the living and the dead, linked to an idea of
cosmological equilibrium and a social balance of power and moral order (ibid.:
15). As with any social or cultural ideal, such a balanced equilibrium is something
to be striven for, even if never fully achievable. Social harmony is an ethnographic
descriptor rooted in observations of Acholi daily life and crises. It refers to a rep-
ertoire of norms, important among which is the deeply social and cosmological
idea of ‘good existence’. It encompasses the Acholi concept of piny maber, or
‘good surroundings’ – which Okot p’Bitek (1986: 27) describes as ‘when things
are normal, the society thriving, facing and overcoming crises’, and which
Finnström (2008) contrasts with piny marac, the ‘bad surroundings’ of the nor-
thern Uganda war. It concerns what is considered kit mapore – the ‘right or
ﬁtting way/behaviour’ to coexist with one another, a sense of an appropriate
way of life, of Acholi propriety – and the importance of bed ki woro, or ‘be[ing]
with respect’, for both the living and the dead (Porter 2016). These notions are
enmeshed in what people refer to as cik Acholi, which can be roughly (if inad-
equately) translated as Acholi ‘law’ and is often evoked on both sides of contested
issues and arguments to assert moral probity (ibid.).
Cik Acholi is best conceptualized not as ‘established precepts’ but as a loosely
constructed repertoire of contested norms (Comaroff and Roberts 1981: 4). Such
notions are constantly negotiated and evolving. They do not represent a singular,
uncontested Acholi cosmology. Contestation and negotiation over normative
schemes have long been central concerns in Africanist anthropology (Colson
1953; Comaroff and Roberts 1981; Gluckman 1955; 1971; Hutchinson 1996;
Turner 1957): they have been seen as normal and, at least within certain
bounds, compatible with ‘stability’ (Gluckman 1955). In systems where continued
allegiance to kin is emphasized, for example, spouses are often in conﬂict: ‘The
result is that conﬂicts in one set of relationships, over a wider range of society
or through a longer period of time, lead to the reestablishment of social cohesion’
(Gluckman 1955: 2). Recognizing that contestation is central to social life,
Gluckman nonetheless describes the highly inequitable divisions and oppositions
within South Africa with terms such as ‘social cohesion’ and ‘ideological consen-
sus’ rooted in a deep interdependence of interests between subordinate and hege-
monic social dynamics (1971: 127, 134). Thus the term ‘harmony’ does not elide
contestation, but draws attention to the constant negotiation of norms and the
interaction between ‘non-state’ security groups in Acholiland and state authorities describes a
form of ‘arbitrary governance’ by the latter, in which ‘central state actors continually redeﬁne
the boundary between … legal and illegal’ in order to control ‘distant populations’. In a
similar vein, Goodfellow (2014: 753–5) describes the ‘tactical legal manoeuvres’ that the
Ugandan government has deployed in order to destabilize the political opposition, particularly
since the return of multiparty politics post-2005, and in response to rising urban-based riots
and protests.
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ways in which they are regularly transgressed. Acholi, like many other people,
have an idea that relations have an optimal temperature range; they become prob-
lematic or even dangerous when they reach the upper limit or boiling point, neces-
sitating ‘cooling’ (Abrahams 1972).
So what restores or maintains social harmony in the Acholi context? One
important way of putting social relationships right after wrongdoing among
Acholi involves payments linked to notions of accountability. Money (or other
wealth) can be an important means to resolve indebtedness that results from
social interactions.65 Therefore, compensation is a typical mode of dealing with
transgressions, but has meaning beyond its material component. The signiﬁcance
of compensation can be understood through the inextricability of social relation-
ships and material exchanges. As would be true for many senior LRA members,
Kwoyelo lacks the material and social resources to compensate or reconcile
with each of his alleged victims. In many cases, doing so would not be feasible
because of the particular nature of the crimes committed, which may be too
grave, widespread and awful to make reconciliation or full compensation possible.
Reactions of those closer to Kwoyelo and his alleged crimes indicate that his pres-
ence would jeopardize and threaten social harmony. The perceptions of his essen-
tially ‘rotten’ character, and the nature and extent of his alleged wrongdoing,
surpass the material or social resources required for compensation or reconcili-
ation, and indeed seem to be beyond the bounds of Acholi moral jurisdiction.
The trial is therefore seen as contributing to social harmony by potentially removing
the destabilizing prospect of Kwoyelo returning home. On the other hand, the reac-
tions of the wider Acholi community – those less affected by Kwoyelo’s crimes –
suggest that the punishment of Kwoyelo is potentially disruptive to social
harmony. These are indicative of a broader concern about the pernicious role of
‘distanced’, politicized justice institutions that lack both moral authority and
moral jurisdiction at the local level.
Deep distrust of distanced justice actors likewise affects those who want to see
Kwoyelo punished. This can lead to conﬂicted, even contradictory, feelings about
his prosecution. At one site where Kwoyelo allegedly commanded a horriﬁc mas-
sacre, most people said that they would gladly see him punished. When the
Constitutional Court ruled that he be granted amnesty and released, many were
unhappy about the prospect of him going free. At the same time, however,
many also shared concerns mentioned above about the independence of the
ICD, the arbitrary way in which he was denied amnesty to begin with, and the
lack of attention to state crimes, and were angry about other senior members of
the LRA who were ‘walking free’. Which crimes were chosen to prosecute and
which were excluded – for example, sexual crimes – was equally unclear, and
the decision was generally regarded to be arbitrary and unfair.66
In different ways, the evidence considered above reveals that while people’s opi-
nions differed on these matters, often as a result of their direct relationship to the
65The inextricability of obligations/material exchanges and social relationships is part of social
life in many contexts, not only in the context of wrongdoing or crime (Zelizer 1989). In Acholi this
is vividly illustrated through Porter’s ongoing research on Acholi love and relationships.
66At the pre-trial hearing on 16 August 2016, when one of the authors was in attendance, the
prosecution revealed its intention to expand charges to include those pertaining to sexual violence.
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alleged perpetrator and their particular wartime experiences, the ICD remained
relatively ‘distant’ as an institution of justice for most. For those who suffered dir-
ectly as a result of Kwoyelo’s alleged crimes, his character was so reprehensible
and his crimes so odious to the moral community that most wanted him excluded
by whatever means, perhaps even preferably by an outside institution. For those
who had no direct relationship to him or his wrongdoing, the seemingly arbitrary
actions of the ICD were sometimes seen as further evidence of the validity of their
own position of distrust towards central government authorities, interpreted
through the lens of historical experiences of structural violence and inequality.
Meanwhile, local political leaders employed schematic representations of
Kwoyelo to ‘compete for attention and identiﬁcation’ among their constituents
in ways essentially detached from the technical aspects of the legal process
(Wilke 2010: 146).
FINAL REFLECTIONS: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE TRANSITIONAL
JUSTICE PROJECT
This article paints a complex picture of ‘the local’ in transitional justice, too often
described in simplistic and homogeneous terms. In his study of northern Uganda,
Branch critiques what he calls the ‘ethnojustice’ approach to accountability: the
notion that ‘Africans’, regardless of context, possess an ‘unspoken, unanimous
worldview’ on these issues (Branch 2014: 614). Our ﬁndings add further empirical
weight to this critique: post-conﬂict perspectives on justice and redress are marked
by heterogeneity rather than by consensus. The different representations of
Kwoyelo and varying conceptions of the ‘justness’ of his trial are rooted in intri-
cate conceptions of crime, accountability (often associated with payments of com-
pensation and social acceptance of responsibility) and appropriate ways to redress
wrongdoing, which, in turn, are linked to notions of moral community and the im-
portance of achieving social harmony. In some instances, the ICD and the
Kwoyelo trial made sense from the perspective of these logics; in others, neither
was seen as a constructive way of restoring peace and stability to a society attempt-
ing to recover from a relentlessly long and destructive conﬂict.
The tendency to consider the individual identity of the perpetrator after wrong-
doing, and the extent to which punishment may affect broader relational ﬁelds and
‘the rest of life’, is not unique to Acholiland (Dresch 2012: 12). As has been
pointed out in other rural African contexts, the ‘legal subject’ tends to be con-
structed ‘as a person inextricably linked to family, clan and culture’ (Stevens
2001: 23). In the close-knit rural communities where the vast majority of Acholi
people live, relationships are based on continuous social and economic depend-
ence. As van Velsen once noted, where such relationships exist, even when
formal legal processes do intervene, ‘judges and litigants, and the litigants
among themselves, interact in relationships whose signiﬁcance ranges beyond
the transitoriness of the court or a particular dispute’ (van Velsen 1969: 138;
Stevens 2001: 22). Often, when people are asked about their perspectives on
post-conﬂict justice, they are not thinking about ‘universal truths’ but rather
about this web of interdependent relationships. Thus stylized conceptual distinc-
tions between preferences for ‘retributive’ versus ‘restorative’ approaches to
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accountability, common in the broader transitional justice narrative, are abstrac-
tions that essentialize people’s attitudes as inherent or linked to a particular set of
immovable beliefs, when, instead, people tend to base their views on other contin-
gencies. Will this change our lives? Will it make our lives better, safer, more har-
monious and prosperous, or the opposite (Macdonald forthcoming)? These are
largely pragmatic calculations in that they are based on the maintenance of
systems of mutual social and economic support and obligation, in the context
of a state that is regarded as largely absent and/or corrupt and hostile.
The broader signiﬁcance of this for transitional justice is clear. A misunder-
standing (wilful or otherwise) of these dynamics creates a huge disjuncture
between an imagined ‘local’, artiﬁcially constructed in service of a broader tran-
sitional justice vision, and lived realities in which the ‘local’ is a complex, often
turbulent terrain of social, political and economic ideas and activity. Justice-
sector donors in Uganda, who fund the ICD and broader transitional justice
goals, speak selectively about an Acholi need and desire for retributive punish-
ment, access to formal justice procedures, and human rights guarantees.
Meanwhile, local leaders and some NGOs promote an equally selective vision
of an alternative justice system – one in which Acholi people are forgiving and
willing to reconcile and reintegrate with former combatants through cultural pro-
cesses. Both articulations of ‘Acholi’ needs and desires are polarized, de-politi-
cized, de-economized and de-temporalized. The reality is that people across
Acholiland base their interpretations of Kwoyelo and his trial on two things:
ﬁrst, on the moral jurisdiction and probity of the institution responsible for
forming judgment and overseeing punishment; and second, on the impact these
processes will have on social harmony in post-conﬂict life.
Rather than grapple with this complexity, some transitional justice advocates
have tended to try to offset epistemological differences through procedural plural-
ism, hence the popularity of ‘holistic’ transitional justice across the continent,
which incorporates formal ‘retributive’ criminal processes and informal ‘restora-
tive’ reconciliatory processes. This faith in ‘holism’, we suggest, needs re-thinking.
It is not a silver bullet that will make transitional justice more context-sensitive
because it does not adequately address foundational assumptions. These continue
to be based on idealistic norms rather than on genuine engagement with ‘intersub-
jectively constructed concepts’ that inform people’s perspectives on post-conﬂict
justice (Gauri et al. 2013).
Such assumptions are hardly unique to the Acholi context, and generalizations
about the post-conﬂict justice proclivities of entire ‘victim’ populations, from
Sierra Leone to DRC, are not unusual.67 What we argue for here is a careful in-
terrogation of the category of victim, and better understanding of the composite
nature of the category. The question then remains: how should transitional
justice advocates integrate the divergent opinions of victims in their program-
ming? A good start would be to develop an evidence-based understanding of
the ‘victim’ category in any given situation. Transitional justice, as espoused
and implemented by international agencies, claims to be ‘victim-centred’, but
this can be disingenuous and regularly involves post facto instrumentalization
of an ‘imagined victim’ or ‘symbolic beneﬁciary’ to justify programmes that are
67See, for example, Hollis (2015).
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already in motion (McEvoy and McConnachie 2013: 494–7). Uganda’s transi-
tional justice framework emphasizes a ‘victim-centered’ approach (JLOS 2012:
11), yet we know that the ICD was not set up as a ‘response to the explicit
needs of victims, as deﬁned by victims themselves’ (Robins 2011: 77).
Existing transitional justice approaches are prescribed with skewed and limited
appreciation of existing conceptions of crime, practices of justice in context, and
how best to engage them. The case of Kwoyelo shows the importance of looking at
war crimes and available options for redress in the political, socio-economic and
institutional context in which they occur, rather than considering them as divorced
from the rest of lived realities. A more sustained engagement with local popula-
tions would most likely reveal something rather inconvenient to transitional
justice advocates: that it is irresponsible to promise all victims that they ‘will
have their voices heard’ and that it is ‘impossible to do justice to all of the
voices of victims affected by past violence’ (McEvoy and McConnachie 2013:
497). A more honest and constructive approach would acknowledge that transi-
tional justice is not a technical legal intervention, but rather a ﬁeld ‘deﬁned by
struggle and born of experience’ (Gready and Robins 2014: 354). At best, it can
provide an opportunity for an open-ended political and economic dialogue that
accepts difference and engages seriously with local as well as state and global
notions of peace and just social order; at worst it represents an externally
devised intervention that is inappropriate for those most affected by violence.
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ABSTRACT
The trial of Thomas Kwoyelo – the ﬁrst war crimes prosecution of a former Lord’s
Resistance Army ﬁghter, and the only domestic war crimes prosecution in Uganda
at the time of writing – has been packed with drama, intrigue and politics. The
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article considers what Kwoyelo’s trial means for those most affected by the crimes
he allegedly committed, and, more broadly, what it means for the ‘transitional
justice’ project in Uganda. The article is concerned primarily with how the trial
has been interpreted ‘on the ground’ in Acholiland: by local leadership; by
those with a personal relationship to Kwoyelo; by direct victims of his alleged
crimes; and by those who were not. Responses to the trial have been shaped by
people’s speciﬁc wartime experiences and if or how his prosecution relates to
their current circumstances – as well as by the profound value of social
harmony and distrust of higher authorities to dispense justice. We conclude
with a discussion of the relevance of our ﬁndings for the practice of ‘transitional
justice’ across the African continent.
RÉSUMÉ
Le procès de Thomas Kwoyelo, le premier pour crimes de guerre d’un ancien com-
battant de la LRA (Lord’s Resistance Army) et le seul pour crimes de guerre en
Ouganda au moment de la rédaction de l’article, a été riche en péripéties, en intri-
gues et en politique. Cet article examine ce que signiﬁe le procès de Kwoyelo pour
ceux qui ont été le plus affectés par les crimes dont on l’a accusé et, plus
généralement, ce que signiﬁe le projet de « justice transitionnelle » en Ouganda.
Il s’intéresse principalement à la manière dont le procès a été interprété « sur le
terrain » dans l’Acholiland : par les dirigeants locaux, par ceux qui avaient une
relation personnelle avec Kwoyelo, par ceux qui ont été directement victimes
des crimes dont on l’a accusé et ceux qui ne l’ont pas été. Les réactions au
procès ont été inﬂuencées par les expériences personnelles spéciﬁques de la
guerre et par la mesure dans laquelle les poursuites à son encontre se sont
rapportées à leurs circonstances actuelles, ainsi que par la profonde valeur d’har-
monie sociale et le manque de conﬁance dans la capacité des autorités supérieures
à exercer la justice. L’auteur conclut par une discussion sur l’intérêt de ses résultats
de recherche pour la pratique de la « justice transitionnelle » sur le continent
africain.
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